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The Role of Public Funding in Nanotechnology Scientific 
Production: Where Canada Stands in Comparison to the United 
States 
Leila Tahmooresnejad1, Catherine Beaudry2*,	  Andrea Schiffauerova3 
Polytechnique Montreal, Montreal, QC, H3C 3A7, Canada 
Concordia University, Montreal, QC, H3G 1M8, Canada 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents cross-country comparisons between Canada and the United States in terms of the 
impact of public grants and scientific collaborations on subsequent nanotechnology-related publications. 
In this study we present the varying involvement of academic researchers and government funding to 
capture the influence of funded research in order to help government agencies evaluate their efficiency in 
financing nanotechnology research. We analyze the measures of quantity and quality of research output 
using time-related econometric models and compare the results between nanotechnology scientists in 
Canada and the United States. The results reveal that both research grants and the position of researchers 
in co-publication networks have a positive influence on scientific output. Our findings demonstrate that 
research funding yields a significantly positive linear impact in Canada and a positive non-linear impact 
in the United States on the number of papers and in terms of the number of citations we observe a positive 
impact only in the US. Our research shows that the position of scientists in past scientific networks plays 
an important role in the quantity and quality of papers published by nanotechnology scientists. 
Keywords: Nanotechnology, Research funding, Scientific papers, Collaboration, Network 
analysis 	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Introduction 
Nanotechnology is an emerging technology that is considered one of the primary forces to drive 
future economic development. For this reason, worldwide investment in this emerging 
technology has increased substantially in the past two decades and governments have 
considerably subsidized nanotechnology-related R&D in recent years. Fitzgibbons and McNiven 
(2006) indicate that in Canada the main funding source for nanotechnology R&D is the Canadian 
government which provides the funding through different organizations: the Natural Sciences 
and Engineering Research Council (NSERC), Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR), 
National Research Council (NRC), Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI), etc. In addition to 
the federal funding, various activities are concentrated in specific provinces in Canada to develop 
nanotechnology. The British Columbia Nanotechnology Alliance, Nanotechnology Network of 
Ontario, NanoQuebec and NanoAlberta are the main provincial frameworks that help develop 
nanotechnology along with the federal programs (Dufour 2005; Allan et al. 2008; Pelley and 
Saner 2009).  
According to Roco (2005), the United States invested approximately $1 billion US in 
government funding dedicated to nanotechnology R&D in 2005, 65% of which was specifically 
allocated to academic R&D and education. The US government nanotechnology funding has 
been raised mainly by the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), which was launched in 
2000 and consists of numerous federal agencies. Fifteen NNI agencies are responsible for the 
funding of nanotechnology research and development. The NNI has invested $18 billion in total 
since 2001, and $1.8 billion has been provided for 2013 alone. The National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) are two agencies that occupy the second 
largest investment rank in 2011 between the agency members of the NNI after the Department of 
Energy (DOE) (NNI 2013; Jacob and Lefgren 2011; Sargent 2010).  
Given the magnitude of government investment in nanotechnology research in recent years, it is 
of great importance to measure the efficiency and productivity of research financing. The 
efficient allocation of government resources requires a better understanding of how funding 
influences scientists’ productivity and their scientific output. Such financing evaluations can help 
governments develop policies that will foster the development of this emerging technology.  
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Nanotechnology is an emerging technology that will have enormous impact on future products 
and processes. This technology has potential to affect economic development and gives new 
tools for governments to take advantage of the recent leaps in technology and science. Growing 
understanding of the role of public funding research in nanotechnology development will help 
governments to launch strategies that meet their high expectations associated with this new 
concept. Considering the potential new world market of nanotechnology related products, 
countries develop research in the field of nanotechnology to ensure that they are going to take 
advantage of the opportunities that are available in this area. In this study, we therefore focus on 
government grants rather than other funding sources. This leads to a strong necessity to study the 
impact of public funding, with a special focus on the public funding sources in the field of 
nanotechnology. We hence compare the impact of investments in Canada with that of the US, 
which is a leader in setting up numerous targeted nanotechnology programs and research grants 
in the hope of fostering future economic development. It is of great importance to realize that 
whether the research funding strategies have been productive in this field. 
To explore the impact of public funding on scientific papers, to reflect how nanotechnology 
research grants influence researchers’ productivity, we utilize econometric models to measure 
this impact on the quantity and quality of nanotechnology-related papers. The evidence of past 
studies (Huang et al. 2005; Payne and Siow 2003) reveals the positive impact of government 
funding on research output. Because scientists increasingly work in larger teams, in addition to 
research financing, we wish to discuss the role that scientific networks play in the scientific 
production. This paper thus explores the effects that collaboration networks have on research 
productivity by measuring the position of these researchers within scientific co-publication 
networks. According to the work by Ni et al. (2011) and Breschi et al. (2006), researchers who 
have more connections with other scientists in networks publish more papers and tend to 
collaborate more with other researchers, enhancing research output. 
There are some important differences between the US and the Canadian science, technology and 
innovation system. Although Canadian universities play key roles in basic research and produce 
a reasonable number of research papers, their contribution to domestic industrial research is less 
than that of US institutions. The majority of university research funding is provided through 
government grants and industry accounts for a small part in Canada whereas private funding is 
considerable in the US (Niosi 2000).  
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Our main contribution consists in further understanding how government research funding and 
scientific networks influence research publications in the field of nanotechnology. The remainder 
of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical background focuses on 
university research funding and social network analysis, from which hypotheses are drawn 
concerning public grants and collaborations. In Section 3, we discuss variables, econometric 
models and the methodology employed. Section 4 discusses regression results and graphs, and 
finally Section 5 concludes. 
Conceptual framework 
Nanotechnology is a relatively young discipline characterized by different subfields. It generated 
almost a quarter trillion dollars worth of products worldwide in 2009 and $91 billion of these 
products found their market in the US. This emerging technology draws substantial amounts of 
public and private investment and its relative success encourages governments to increase their 
funding in nanotechnology research (Canton 1999, Freeman and Shukla 2008; Roco and 
Bainbridge 2005; Roco 2011).  
US financial investment in nanotechnology research has been substantial in the last decade. The 
US government plays a central role in nanotechnology research programs and is among the 10 
leading countries in nanotechnology. The US ranked first in terms of nanotechnology public 
funding in 2006 (Roco et al. 2011; Sargent 2008). Youtie et al. (2008) reviewed the rapid growth 
of nanotechnology publications in different countries between 1990 and 2006 and showed that 
the US has been one of the leading countries in nanotechnology research and that it has ranked 
first in terms of the quality of publications. Furthermore, the major US federal support of 
nanotechnology academic research is provided by the interagency program of the NNI which is 
mostly motivated by an interest in economic outcomes (Mowery 2011). The public funding of 
nanotechnology academic research fosters the emergence of collaboration among universities, 
industry and government and highlights a Triple-Helix of relationships between these 
organizations (Etzkowitz 2008; Leydesdorff and Meyer 2006; Schultz 2011). Niosi (2000) shows 
that universities in the US are frequently encouraged to collaborate more with industries and this 
collaboration streams industry funding toward university research.  
In Canada, the majority of university research funding is provided through public funding, while 
private firms account for only a small part of research funding (Fitzgibbons and McNiven 2006; 
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Mcfetridge 1993; Niosi 2000). The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council 
(NSERC) focuses on university and industry collaborations through Industrial Chairs and 
Collaborative R&D programs. The Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR), the Canada 
Foundation for Innovation (CFI) and National Research Council (NRC) are other federal 
agencies that provide funding for R&D (Gordon 2002). 
Addressing how universities, play a significant role in knowledge-based nanotechnology 
research, Hullmann (2006) and Mcfetridge (1993) indeed suggest that the number of academic 
publications is an appropriate indicator to understand the growth of this new technology. 
Furthermore, the number of citations papers receive is a quality index that can properly measure 
the impact of researchers.  
Many scholars (Hudson 2007; Lawani 1986; Moed 2005; Schoonbaert 1996) study the number 
of citations to measure the quality of papers and argue that high-quality papers receive 
significantly more citations. Despite some problems that arise in using the number of citations as 
a quality index for papers, it is widely used and still considered to be an appropriate indicator. 
For example critics such as Adler et al. (2009) highlight that citation analysis does provide 
worthwhile information and should be part of the evaluation process.  
Following the massive investment in nanotechnology, the interest in the influence funded 
research has on scientific output has also increased in recent years. Huang et al. (2005) highlight 
that it is imperative to understand the impact of public funding on nanotechnology research 
output and nanotechnology development. Some scholars examine the impact of funding on 
scientific output and their results indicate that government R&D funding in universities increases 
the number of publications (Adams and Griliches 1998; Blume-Kogut et al. 2009; Fitzgibbons 
and McNiven 2006; Mcfetridge 1993). Payne and Siow (2003) demonstrate that a one million 
dollar increase in government funding in a research university yields ten additional papers. In 
another study in the US, Jacob and Lefgren (2007) investigate the influence of the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) grants on researchers and research productivity. According to their 
study, NIH postdoctoral fellowships increase the rate of publications by nearly twenty percent in 
the following five years as well as the citations received by these papers. Obtaining research 
funding affects the productivity of researchers in other ways, for instance, Adams et al. (2005) 
recognized that according to a study in the top 110 US universities, public funding significantly 
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affects the size of scientific teams. Scientists with prestigious awards and a large stock of federal 
funding are encouraged to collaborate in larger teams. This collaboration increases research 
quality and consequently these scientists are more cited (Sauer 1988; Adams et al. 2005). Arora 
et al. (1998) raised the point of a positive influence on publication quality and mentioned that it 
acts as a signal for the government to allocate additional funding to higher-quality researchers.  
Although the number of citations can be used as a proxy to measure the scientific quality of 
papers, we must recognize and address the disparity in citation rates of papers published in 
English compared to those in French, a concern evident for Canada. Poomkottayil et al. (2011) 
found that English papers are seven times more cited based on the Google Scholar database 
compared to non-English papers (German or French papers in their study). The theoretical study 
of Van Leeuwen et al. (2001) showed that the impact factors of non-English language journals 
are considerably lower than English-language journals. Due to increased interest in the 
bibliometric evaluation of papers in recent years, it is important to recognize that the language of 
publication affects such analyses. 
Empirical evidence of Matthew effect can be shown at various aggregation levels: countries, 
research institutions and individual researchers. The Matthew effect holds that the most 
influential scientists gain more influence (Merton 1968; Larivière and Gingras 2010). Some 
studies used the number of citations as Matthew indicator and showed that specific papers, 
researchers or even universities are more frequently cited compared to others (Bonitz et al. 1997; 
Katz 1999; Tol 2009). According to Laudel (2006), scientists that have already received funding 
are more likely to receive more funding, which is evidence of Matthew effect in research 
funding. This effect can occur at the individual or department level, hence indicating that those 
that obtain the most funds become even more successful in subsequent grant applications. 
Since the US is a leading country in nanotechnology research and research funding, in light of 
the impact of government research financing on nanotechnology-related scientific output and the 
difference between the influence of research funding in Canada and the US, we aim to probe the 
following hypotheses in this paper separately for Canada and the US. 
Hypothesis 1: Increased public funding to nanotechnology scientists contributes to (a) more 
nanotechnology-related publications and (b) higher-quality nanotechnology-related 
publications. 
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Scientists generally work in research communities and tend to publish the results in research 
groups. Glänzel and Schubert (2005) highlighted co-publication networks as a tangible measure 
of scientific collaborations. Since the collaboration of researchers is seen to be of great 
importance in fostering output productivity research, funding is commonly allocated to research 
teams, particularly when the amount of financing is rather large. Theoretical studies show a 
positive correlation between the collaboration of researchers and their respective scientific 
output. For example Newman (2001) and Balconi et al. (2004) constructed a scientist network 
using co-authorship information to study the interconnected nature of scientists in these 
networks.  Ni et al. (2011) and Breschi et al. (2006) stated that scientists with central positions in 
the network produce more papers compared to other scientists that are less central. Velema 
(2012) argues that collaborative ties in co-authorship networks lead to receiving more citations. 
The diffusion of knowledge is thus more efficient among researchers who actively collaborate 
and the numerous collaborations help researchers to increase their productivity. The question we 
address in this paper is how evolving scientific networks influence the emergence of new 
publications and enhance the quality of these publications in Canada, as well as the difference in 
this impact between Canada and the US. In order to measure whether collaborations in Canada 
have a similar impact as in the US on nanotechnology scientific output, we therefore consider the 
following hypotheses separately for Canada and the US: 
Hypothesis 2: A better network position4 of nanotechnology scientists within co-publication 
networks has a positive effect on (a) the number of publications and (b) on the quality of 
publications.  
In Canada the proportion of government-funded R&D is high compared to industrial R&D 
(Niosi 2000). We therefore propose in our third Hypothesis to test whether this government 
funding leads to scientific production of higher quality and quantity in Canada in comparison to 
the impact of public funding in the US: 
Hypothesis 3: Increased public funding to nanotechnology scientists in Canada contributes to 
(a) more nanotechnology-related publications and (b) higher-quality nanotechnology-related 
publications in Canada compared to increased public funding to nanotechnology scientists in the 
US. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 We consider higher betweenness centrality and higher cliquishness in terms of better network position. 
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Data and methodology 
Data and Variables 
The rapid growth of nanotechnology implies that governments have to develop a complete 
database of all desired information about nanotechnology development and commercial 
utilization (Holtz 2007). This study requires the evaluation of scientific output during the periods 
in which public grants were received by researchers. Our data was extracted from different 
databases of articles and patents to which at least one Canadian-affiliated and one American-
affiliated scientist contributed: We extracted publication and authorship data from Elsevier’s 
Scopus using specific keyword searches, described below, for nanotechnology-related 
publications, while the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) provided the related 
patenting information for these researchers.  
We chose Elsevier’s Scopus since it provides accurate and more comprehensive information 
regarding author affiliations, which greatly facilitates the disambiguation of author’s names, 
especially for data dating as far back as 1985. Scopus directly links authors and their affiliations 
while this feature is relatively recent in other databases. We examined other databases (JCR, 
Science Direct, Web of Science, Microsoft Academic Search, Scirus, Google Scholar, etc.) and 
realized that Scopus covers a wide diversity of fields and additional information, which was 
deemed more appropriate to our needs regarding an emerging multidisciplinary field that may 
not at first get published in the “best” journals that are currently listed in the Web of Science for 
instance. 
The Canadian Federal granting agencies database provided information on government research 
financing from the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) 
and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR). For US researchers we used Nanobank 
which is a dataset of scientific journal articles, patents and government grants (NIH and NSF 
grants) in nanotechnology (Nanobank 2013; NSF 2013 ; Zucker et al. 2011).  
For the purpose of this research and in order to have precise data on nanotechnology-related 
publications in the US, we combined the keywords from various keyword search strategies of 
several scholars (Alencar et al. 2007; Fitzgibbons and McNiven 2006; Mogoutov and Kahane 
2007; Noyons et al. 2003; Porter et al. 2008; Zucker and Darby 2005; Zitt and Bassecoulard 
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2006) while removing the redundant keywords after consulting with nanotechnology experts. We 
believe that the final set of keywords is quite comprehensive and is able to effectively identify 
articles directly related to nanotechnology. 
In order to complement and clean the large data, we extracted data using a combination of 
Scopus and Google Scholar since the latter enabled us to search the full text of publications for 
nanotechnology-related keywords. We used the “Publish or Perish” software to filter the results 
in Google Scholar and then matched each identified article with the data from Scopus. This 
methodology allowed us to combine an in-depth full-text search of Google Scholar with well-
structured data from Scopus.  
We then merged our data from different sources using a unique ID for each individual scientist. 
A considerable amount of work was required to perform the disambiguation of scientists’ names 
in merging different publishing, patenting and funding databases. We performed a check of 
individuals’ name to avoid ambiguity and bias in our data. We then created a panel dataset in 
which we compiled yearly information for each individual scientist over the period 1985 to 2005. 
Selecting for the regressions the years 1996 onwards yields 33,655 individual US scientists and 
3,684 Canadian scientists in our final panel data5. 
In relation to our hypotheses, let us first define the variables measuring the quantity and quality 
of papers (H1a and H1b). The variable nbPaper counts the number of papers that are published 
every year by an individual scientist. It is used to measure the impact of government funding on 
the quantity of scientific output. We used three spans of citation counts, nbCitation, that the 
articles of a scientist received within three, five and seven years after the publication year to 
measure paper quality. We found more consistent results using five-year citations (nbCitation5) 
for our time period (1996-2005).  
This study addresses the impact that funding granted for nanotechnology academic research has 
on scientific output. We thus calculate the average amount of public funding received over three 
years (GovGrant3) lagged by one-year to account for the time lapse between receiving 
government grants and generating scientific output. We also add the square of GovGrant3, to 
investigate the non-linear effect of public funding. This will allow the validation of hypothesis 1. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Even though the regressions are estimated on a sample starting in 1996, we extracted data from 1985 onwards to 
build the ‘career age’ variable described below. 
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To examine our second hypothesis we explore how a researcher’s position in his/her co-
authorship network influences his/her scientific output by computing two measures related to 
their network position: betweenness centrality (BetweenCent) and cliquishness or clustering 
coefficient (Cliquishness). Betweenness centrality is generally employed to evaluate the 
importance of a researcher as an intermediary in a network and refers to the proportion of all 
geodesic distances6 between two scientists that include the specific scientist. This measure 
indicates which researcher potentially controls the flow of knowledge between pairs of scientists 
(Benedictis and Tajoli 2008; Izquierdo and Hanneman 2006). Cliquishness is computed using the 
egocentric density7 that refers to the likelihood that two scientists who are both connected to a 
specific third scientist are also connected to each other (Barabasi 2002; Singh 2007). These two 
variables will allow the validation of hypothesis 2 (H2a and H2b).  
The evolution of collaborations between scientists over years was analyzed using three-year co-
publication sub-networks. An important consideration relates to the time period of collaboration 
networks. Fleming et al. (2007) used three-year windows to analyze the effect of past network 
structure on collaborative creativity. Nerkar and Paruchuri (2005) also opt for three-year 
windows to study the R&D activities in inventor networks. We therefore created three-year co-
authorship sub-networks8 for all the three-year moving intervals using the social network 
analysis software Pajek, which is considered to be very suitable for the analysis of large 
networks (Batagelj and Mrvar 1998).  
In addition to the variables of interest, another issue that we take into account is non-publication 
innovative output of researchers that may restrict their scientific output. Debates have arisen 
around the question of whether the involvement of academics in patenting can produce negative 
impacts on their publication record. Despite the concerns about the substitution effects of 
university patents on publications, Geuna and Nesta (2006) argue that university papers and 
patents are not really substitutes, and a growing literature (e.g. Azoulay et al. 2006; Louis et al. 
1989; Carayol and Matt, 2004) is in fact proposing that patents and publications are 
complements.  Moreover, Van Looy et al. (2004, 2006) show that university researchers who are 
involved in patenting activities publish more articles in applied fields and Azoulay (2009), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Geodesic distance is a shortest path between any particular pair of researchers in a scientific network. 
7 Egocentric density is the density among a researcher’s direct connections and indicates the fraction of possible 
links present in the network (Koput, 2010). 
8 We also constructed five-year sub-networks, but three-year sub-networks gave us more consistent results. 
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Czarnitzki, et al. (2007) and Wong and Sing (2010) reveal that the patenting activity of academic 
researchers positively influences publication output in universities. In this regard, we study the 
influence of academic researchers’ nanotechnology-related patents from the past three years to 
examine whether there is a correlation between these patents and their future publications 
(nbPast3Pat). We also add the square of nbPast3Pat to investigate the non-linear effect of 
researchers’ past patents on scientific output.  
Governments implement various mechanisms to allocate funding to universities based on 
research performance (Geuna et al. 2003; Liefner 2003). A notable concern in our study is that 
researchers with a higher performance receive more funding from governments: this causes 
potential endogeneity due to simultaneity and omitted variable bias. To deal with this potential 
endogeneity, we employ instrumental variables techniques in our econometrics models to correct 
for endogeneity and add a number of control variables in addition to the variables of interest.  
We first identify the career age (CareerAge) of nanotechnology scientists as the time elapsed 
since their first publication in nanotechnology. This variable shows how long a scientist has been 
active in this field and is a proxy for experience of a scientist in this field over time. Some 
scholars such as Cole (1979), Costas et al. (2010) and Stephan and Levin (1993) highlight the 
influence of career age on the performance of scientists to account for the fact that older 
scientists are more productive and more likely to receive grants. To consider the fact that the past 
articles are used to evaluate the proposals that lead to the granting of public funding, we use the 
average number of papers published by researchers in the past three years with a one-year lag 
(nbAvgPapers3).  
 Model specification 
There are various models for count data that have been used in economics and industrial 
organizations. The Poisson model is the most frequently employed method in such modeling 
(Hausman et al. 1984; King 1989; Riphahn et al. 2003). Because of the restriction on the 
distribution in the Poisson model regarding over-dispersion, some researchers find that the 
Negative Binomial Model (NB) is more appropriate (Greene 2008; Hilbe 2011). Many scholars 
have employed one of these two methods to analyze count data (Wang et al. 1998; Fleming and 
Sorenson 2001; Maurseth and Verspagen 2002; Mowery et al. 2002; Payne and Siow 2003; 
Tsionas 2010; Petruzzelli 2011). In the Poisson model, it is assumed that the conditional variance 
	   12 
equals the mean. The dependent variable 𝑦!" in Equation (1) follows a Poisson distribution where 
the mean is function of the coefficients 𝛽 and of the covariates 𝑥!" as shown in Equation (2), (𝑖 
indexes individual researchers and 𝑡  indexes years).  
Pr(yit xit ) =
e−λitλityit
yit!
  (1) 
E(yit xit ) = λit = exitβ 	  	  	   (2) 
The Poisson model imposes equi-dispersion as shown by Equation (3): 
E(yit xit ) =Var[yit xit ]= λit 	   (3) 
If the variance of yit is larger than the mean (E(yit xit )<Var[yit xit ] ), we have over-dispersion in 
the data, which implies that the Negative Binomial Regression is a proper alternative for this 
method. 𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝜀!"  is assumed to follow a gamma distribution where the variance equals α and the 
mean equals 1 (Hausman et al. 1984; King 1989; Greene 2008), which yields equations (4) and 
(5). 
λit = Exp(βxit +εit ) 	  	   (4) 
 Var[yit xit ]= E(yit xit ) 1+α E(yit xit!" #$( ) 	   	  (5) 
We thus use both the Poisson and Negative Binomial models in our regressions to find the most 
consistent and significant results in measuring the impact of government grants and of network 
position on the quantity of scientific publications (represented by nbPaperit of academic 
researcher i in year t) and on the publication quality (represented by nbCitation5it). In case of 
having excessive zeros in our count data, we consider zero-inflated Poisson vs. Poisson and zero-
inflated negative binomial vs. negative binomial model and use Voung test as suggested by 
Vuong (1989). Zero-inflated models allow for complication of analyzing datasets with an 
excessive number of outcome zeros (Greene 1994; Long 1997; Vuong 1989). For the given data, 
Vuong test proved zero-inflated models are superior over standard Poisson and negative 
binomial models. 
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We express the model to be estimated in Equation (6), which shows our two dependent variables 
explained by the same function. We examined a variety of lag structures during the course of our 
study and presented models are the models which yield the most consistent results. Logically, 
however, one would think that the team is formed first, then they apply for funding and do the 
work to finally publish. Learning from collaborators and integrating into knowledge networks 
needs time to lead to further jointly developed publications. So we would expect that the network 
variables to be lagged by at least two years and the funding variables to be lagged by at least one 
year.  
nbPaperit
nbCitation5it
!
"
#
$
%
&= f
GovGrant3it−1( ), GovGrant3it−1( )!" $%
2
nbPast3Patit,[nbPast3Patit ]2,BetweenCent3it−2,Cliquishness3it−2,
Cliquishness3it−2 )[ ]2 ,nbPast3Patit ×BetweenCent3it−2,
BetweenCent3it−2 ×Cliquishness3it−2,dt )
)
*
+
+
+
+
+
,
-
.
.
.
.
.
 (6) 
	  
We also test the moderating effect between our variables by introducing interactive variables. 
This helps us to examine whether betweenness centrality has an intrinsic relation with patenting 
and cliquishness, and it also moderates the influence of these two measures on the dependent 
variables. To account for the fact that funding may affect both scientific output and the number 
of patents to which a researcher may have contributed, we treat the amount of grants received as 
endogenous. Given the potential endogeneity, we test three instruments for this variable to 
correct this problem. One of the alternatives that is suggested in econometric studies to estimate 
the parameters in this model on a set of instrumental variables is the Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) method (Biro 2009; Terza et al. 2008; Stephan et al. 2007).  
We thus express the first and second stage of our estimations in Equation (7) to account for the 
endogeneity bias on the average amount of grants received over three years by scientists in 
nanotechnology. The first stage regression estimates the endogenous variable on a set of 
instruments and the predicted value is then computed and added to the second stage regressions. 
The resulting first stage and second stage regressions are given by: 
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GovGrant3it−l = f (CareerAgeit−1,CareerAge2it−1,nbAvgPaper3it−l,Variables2nd Stage,dt )
2SLS :
nbPaperit
nbCitation5it
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(predicted1st GovGrant3it−1( ), predicted1st GovGrant3it−1( )"# %&
2
nbPast3Patit,[nbPast3Patit ]2,BetweenCent3it−2,Cliquishness3it−2,
Cliquishness3it−2 )[ ]2 ,BetweenCent3it−2 ×Cliquishness3it−2,
BetweenCent3it−2 ×Cliquishness3it−2,dt )
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+
+
+
+
,
-
.
.
.
.
.
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*
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
,
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
	   	  (7)	  
Regression Results 
Our study evaluates the impact of research funding and collaborations on scientific productions 
by measuring the quantity and quality of publications. The results showed in this section present 
the most reliable results. As mentioned previously we examined a variety of lag structures (one, 
two and three years) to investigate the most appropriate time period for each variable. As 
expected, the most significant results were obtained with a one-year lag for government grants 
and a two-year lag for the network.  
Two groups of results are presented in which the first group does not account for potential 
endogeneity of public funding and the second group represents the results of the second stage for 
2SLS regressions.  
We find that the zero-inflated Poisson model (clustering method) yields significant and 
consistent results and hence present only this model in the paper9 as justified by Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001). We start from a simple model and hierarchically add quadratic term of variables 
to the model. The second stage of four models, shown in Table 1 and Table 2 for the number of 
papers and Table 3 and Table 4 for the number of citations, enable us to study the factors that 
influence scientific production in Canada and the US (for the first stage of regressions see 
Appendix A, and Poisson and xtpoisson regressions are presented in Appendix D).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 We estimated more than 15 models as we considered and neglected potential endogeneity using panel data via xtnbreg and xtpoisson. We also 
performed non-paneled regressions using the clustering method of nbreg and Poisson to account for repeated measures of the same individual 
scientist. Note that we tried zero-inflated negative binomial model as well, but it does not work on our data for the number of papers and the 
results for the number of citations are similar to zero-inflated Poisson model. 
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Table 1 Impact of public funding on nanotech papers in Canada - Second stage of regression results of zero-inflated Poisson (Standard 
errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Canada 
nbPaperit
 zip – model (1)  zip – model (2)  zip – model (3)  zip – model (4) 
W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS 
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
-0.0056                 -0.0055      -0.0088                  0.0873 *                (0.0086)                 (0.0087)      (0.0085)                  (0.0480)                 
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.1045 *** 0.0962 ***  0.1506 *** 0.1293 **  0.1120 ** 0.1103 **  0.1194 ** 0.1101 ** 
(0.0149)  (0.0149)   (0.0527)  (0.0520)   (0.0551)  (0.0546)   (0.0552)  (0.0545)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 0.3492 *** 0.3330 ***  0.3480 *** 0.3340 ***  0.1782 *** 0.1795 ***  0.1847 *** 0.1792 *** 
(0.0515)  (0.0487)   (0.0508)  (0.0487)   (0.0509)  (0.0510)   (0.0503)  (0.0509)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 0.0495 *** 0.0429 ***  0.0476 *** 0.0416 ***  0.7381 *** 0.7147 ***  0.7233 *** 0.7147 *** 
(0.0127)  (0.0133)   (0.0131)  (0.0137)   (0.0932)  (0.1014)   (0.0918)  (0.1010)  
[ nbPast3Patit]2 
     -0.0033  -0.0015   -0.0016  -0.0014   -0.0022  -0.0012  
     (0.0030)  (0.0029)   (0.0034)  (0.0033)   (0.0034)  (0.0034)  
[ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)]2
 
          -0.1047 *** -0.1015 ***  -0.1026 *** -0.1017 *** 
          (0.0143)  (0.0154)   (0.0141)  (0.0153)  
[ln(GovGrant3it-1)]2 
               -0.0095 **                
               (0.0046)                 
Years (1996-2005) Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS 
               0.0890 **    0.0801 **                 0.0126     0.0688                 (0.0375)     (0.0363)                  (0.0319)     (0.0884)  
[Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS]2 
                                                       -0.0051                                                         (0.0086)  
Constant 0.7147 *** 0.2103   0.7211 *** 0.2656   0.6965 *** 0.5845 ***  0.6842 *** 0.4375 * (0.0812)  (0.2164)   (0.0802)  (0.2082)   (0.0826)  (0.1822)   (0.0830)  (0.2504)  
Inflate                                       
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
-0.0124 *    -0.0120     -0.0101     0.1244 **   
(0.0073)     (0.0073)     (0.0075)     (0.0598)    
nbPast3Patit-1
 -0.0977 *** -0.0940 ***  -0.1999 * -0.1889 *  -0.1721  -0.1617   -0.1638  -0.1673  
(0.0350)  (0.0352)   (0.1073)  (0.1093)   (0.1181)  (0.1200)   (0.1193)  (0.1215)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 -0.6803 *** -0.6729 ***  -0.6763 *** -0.6691 ***  -0.1940 ** -0.1995 **  -0.1853 ** -0.1943 ** 
(0.0667)  (0.0669)   (0.0668)  (0.0670)   (0.0779)  (0.0778)   (0.0790)  (0.0777)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 -0.0989 *** -0.0981 ***  -0.0984 *** -0.0975 ***  -1.6485 *** -1.6148 ***  -1.6730 *** -1.6418 *** 
(0.0127)  (0.0127)   (0.0128)  (0.0128)   (0.1779)  (0.1782)   (0.1831)  (0.1773)  
[ nbPast3Patit]2
      0.0126  0.0118   0.0121  0.0113   0.0114  0.0117  
     (0.0144)  (0.0148)   (0.0172)  (0.0176)   (0.0174)  (0.0178)  
[ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)]2
           0.2286 *** 0.2239 ***  0.2322 *** 0.2282 *** 
          (0.0264)  (0.0265)   (0.0272)  (0.0263)  
[ln(GovGrant3it-1)]2 
               -0.0132 **   
               (0.0059)    
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS 
  -0.0391 **    -0.0401 **    -0.0390 **    -0.1041  
  (0.0176)     (0.0175)     (0.0174)     (0.0671)  
[Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS]2 
                 0.0080  
                 (0.0072)  
Constant 1.5421 *** 1.6764 ***  1.5439 *** 1.6864 ***  1.5334 *** 1.6848 ***  1.5165 *** 1.7610 *** (0.0635)  (0.1105)   (0.0637)  (0.1097)   (0.0643)  (0.1053)   (0.0652)  (0.1454)  
Nb observations 
Nb Groups 
8180  8180   8180  8180   8180  8180   8180  8180  
3684  3684   3684  3684   3684  3684   3684  3684  
Loglikelihood -6801.2  -6783.95   -6796.89  -6782.06   -6652.18  -6651.25   -6644.2  -6649.16  c2 200.40 *** 178.09 ***  185.02 *** 165.81 ***  238.11 *** 206.49 ***  246.22  ***205.61 *** 	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Table 2 Impact of public funding on nanotech papers in the US - Second stage of regression results of zero-inflated Poisson (Standard 
errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
The US 
nbPaperit
 
zip – model (1)  zip – model (2)  zip – model (3)  zip – model (4) 
W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS 
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
0.0264 ***               
 
0.0264 ***                 0.0264 ***               
 
-0.0530 *                
(0.0037) 
 
             
 
(0.0037) 
 
                (0.0037) 
 
             
 
(0.0303) 
 
               
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.0035 -0.0006  0.0050 -0.0157   0.0054 -0.0156  0.0058 -0.0062  
(0.0089) 
 
(0.0075) 
 
 (0.0130) 
 
(0.0110)   (0.0130) 
 
(0.0110) 
 
 (0.0131) 
 
(0.0094)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 0.1646 *** 0.1377 **  0.1646*** 0.1347 **  0.1633*** 0.1296**  0.1609*** 0.1272 ** 
(0.0595) 
 
(0.0573) 
 
 (0.0596) 
 
(0.0573)   (0.0593) 
 
(0.0570) 
 
 (0.0596) 
 
(0.0564)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 0.0865 *** 0.0921 ***  0.0865*** 0.0912 ***  0.2135*** 0.2781***  0.2111*** 0.3243 *** 
(0.0059) 
 
(0.0059) 
 
 (0.0060) 
 
(0.0059)   (0.0674) 
 
(0.0686) 
 
 (0.0670) 
 
(0.0672)  
[ nbPast3Patit]2 
   -0.0001 0.0008 **  -0.0001 0.0008**  -0.0001 -0.0001  
     (0.0004) (0.0003)   (0.0004) (0.0003)  (0.0004) (0.0003)  
[ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)]2
 
       -0.0187 * -0.0276 ***  -0.0184 * -0.0320 *** 
         (0.0098)  
(0.0099) 
 
 (0.0097) 
 
(0.0097)  
[ln(GovGrant3it-1)]2 
          0.0067 **                
            (0.0026)                
Years (1996-2005) Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS 
               0.2246 ***   0.2267 ***                 0.2272 ***   -0.1958 ***                (0.0238)  
   (0.0239)                 (0.0238) 
 
   (0.0379)  
[Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-
2SLS]2 
                                                 0.0400 ***                                                    (0.0037)  
Constant 0.5491 *** -0.5575 ***  0.5482 *** -0.5560 ***  0.5500 *** -0.5590 ***  0.5617 *** 0.4177 *** (0.0798) 
 
(0.1586) 
 
 (0.0798) 
 
(0.1583)   (0.0796) 
 
(0.1579) 
 
 (0.0789) 
 
(0.1205)  
Inflate                                  
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
-0.0143 ***    -0.0147 ***    -0.0148 ***    -0.0078    
(0.0030)     (0.0030)     (0.0030)     (0.0233)    
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.0518 *** 0.0532 ***  0.0763 *** 0.0890 ***  0.0760 *** 0.0885 ***  0.0758 *** 0.0951 *** 
(0.0050)  (0.0049)   (0.0079) (0.0086)   (0.0080) (0.0086)  (0.0080) (0.0074)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 -0.5410 *** -0.5253 ***  -0.5390 *** -0.5228 ***  -0.5070 *** -0.4922 ***  -0.5097 *** -0.4875 *** 
(0.1175)  (0.1212)   (0.1177) (0.1218)   (0.1160) (0.1201)  (0.1168) (0.1195)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 -0.3030 *** -0.2873 ***  -0.3025 *** -0.2863 ***  -0.8107 *** -0.7937 ***  -0.8122 *** -0.7790 *** 
(0.0056)  (0.0058)   (0.0056) (0.0058)   (0.0796) (0.0825)  (0.0797) (0.0820)  
[nbPast3Patit]2
    -0.0015 *** -0.0022 ***  -0.0015 *** -0.0022 ***  -0.0015 *** -0.0029 *** 
     (0.0004) (0.0004)   (0.0004) (0.0004)  (0.0004) (0.0003)  
[ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)]2
        0.0751 *** 0.0750 ***  0.0753 *** 0.0739 *** 
          (0.0117)  (0.0121)   (0.0117)  (0.0121)  
[ln(GovGrant3it-1)]2 
          -0.0007   
          (0.0020)   
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS 
 -0.1094 ***   -0.1090 ***   -0.1078 ***   -0.3372 *** 
  (0.0126)     (0.0127)     (0.0128)     (0.0362)  
[Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-
2SLS]2 
           0.0205 *** 
                 (0.0036)  
Constant 2.2126 *** 2.5099 ***  2.1952 *** 2.4759 ***  2.1993 *** 2.4735 ***  2.2021 *** 3.0163 *** (0.0292)  (0.0816)   (0.0295) (0.0817)   (0.0297) (0.0821)  (0.0294) (0.0853)  
Nb observations 
Nb Groups 
56511 56511  56511 56511   56511 56511  56511 56511  
33655  33655   33655 33655   33655 33655  33655 33655  
Loglikelihood -31075.8 
 
-30079.1 
 
 
-31064.7 
 
-
30052.5  
 
-31029.5 
 
-30016.6 
 
 
-31003.1 
-
29717.7  
χ2 454.95*** 502.94***  460.95*** 508.74 ***  460.52****** 518.98  468.44 *** 804.35 *** 	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Table 3 Impact of public funding on nanotech papers’ quality in Canada - Second stage of regression results of zero-inflated Poisson 
(Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Canada 
nbCitation5it
 zip – model (1)  zip – model (2)  zip – model (3)  zip – model (4) 
W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS 
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
0.0038 
 
              
 
0.0038 
 
                0.0018 
 
              
 
0.0617 
 
              
(0.0103)
 
             
 
(0.0103)
 
                (0.0101)
 
             
 
(0.0552)
 
              
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.1228 *** 0.1206 ***  0.1082 0.1032   0.0861 0.0906  0.0861 0.0906  
(0.0154) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
 (0.0690) 
 
(0.0673)   (0.0692) 
 
(0.0689) 
 
 (0.0692) 
 
(0.0689)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 0.2796 *** 0.2750 ***  0.2796*** 0.2750 ***  0.2796*** 0.2750***  0.2796*** 0.2750 *** 
(0.0839) 
 
(0.0816) 
 
 (0.0839) 
 
(0.0816)   (0.0839) 
 
(0.0816) 
 
 (0.0839) 
 
(0.0816)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 0.0182 
 
0.0164 
 
 0.0188
 
0.0175   0.4710*** 0.4913***  0.4627*** 0.4923 *** 
(0.0175)
 
(0.0180)
 
 (0.0182)
 
(0.0187)   (0.1213) 
 
(0.1313) 
 
 (0.1201) 
 
(0.1308)  
[ nbPast3Patit]2 
   0.0009 0.0014   0.0020 0.0016  0.0017 0.0018  
     (0.0035) (0.0033)   (0.0035) (0.0035)  (0.0035) (0.0035)  
[ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)]2
 
       -0.0685 *** -0.0713 ***  -0.0673 *** -0.0717 *** 
          (0.0186)  (0.0200)   (0.0184)  (0.0199)  
[ln(GovGrant3it-1)]2 
          -0.0059               
            (0.0051)               
Years (1996-2005) Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS 
               0.0328  
  0.0252                  -0.0199  
  0.0465                 (0.0455)     (0.0444)                 (0.0407)     (0.1046)  
[Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS]2 
                                                   -0.0062                                                     (0.0098)  
Constant 3.7830 *** 3.6283 ***  3.7806 *** 3.6669 ***  3.7689 *** 3.8822 ***  3.7587 *** 3.7174 *** (0.1051) 
 
(0.2568) 
 
 (0.1038) 
 
(0.2481)   (0.1043) 
 
(0.2252) 
 
 (0.1051) 
 
(0.3011)  
Inflate                                   
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
-0.0138 **    -0.0135 **    -0.0100     0.0619    
(0.0063)     (0.0063)     (0.0065)     (0.0467)    
nbPast3Patit-1
 -0.1075 *** -0.0995 ***  -0.2024 * -0.1796   -0.1626 -0.1451  -0.1601 -0.1502  
(0.0345)  (0.0351)   (0.1067) (0.1093)   (0.1168) (0.1191)  (0.1180) (0.1205)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 -0.7170 *** -0.7060 ***  -0.7140 *** -0.7035 ***  -0.2161 *** -0.2268 ***  -0.2142 *** -0.2227 *** 
(0.0629)  (0.0628)   (0.0629) (0.0628)   (0.0732) (0.0733)  (0.0736) (0.0732)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 -0.1177 *** -0.1140 ***  -0.1166 *** -0.1130 ***  -1.8045 *** -1.7371 ***  -1.8130 *** -1.7615 *** 
(0.0111)  (0.0111)   (0.0111) (0.0111)   (0.1659) (0.1675)  (0.1681) (0.1673)  
[ nbPast3Patit]2
    0.0112 0.0094   0.0099 0.0085  0.0097 0.0089  
     (0.0143) (0.0148)   (0.0171) (0.0176)  (0.0174) (0.0179)  
[ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)]2
        0.2504 *** 0.2409 ***  0.2517 *** 0.2449 *** 
          (0.0246)  (0.0248)   (0.0249)  (0.0248)  
[ln(GovGrant3it-1)]2 
          -0.0071   
          (0.0046)   
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS 
 -0.0751 ***   -0.0744 ***   -0.0604 ***   -0.1343 *** 
  (0.0146)     (0.0145)     (0.0146)     (0.0504)  
[Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS]2 
           0.0086  
                 (0.0056)  
Constant 2.0567 *** 2.3675 ***  2.0592 *** 2.3673 ***  2.0567 *** 2.3099 ***  2.0482 *** 2.4142 *** (0.0508)  (0.0858)   (0.0508) (0.0857)   (0.0511) (0.0847)  (0.0509) (0.1115)  
Nb observations 
Nb Groups 
8180 8180  8180 8180   8180 8180  8180 8180  
3684  3684   3684 3684   3684 3684  3684 3684  
Loglikelihood -49944.9  -49906   -49939.8  -49916.4   -49297.3  -49278.5   -49242.8 -49262.8  χ2 215.54 *** 218.76 ***  363.10 *** ***367.07 ***  304.72 *** 304.95 ***  301.16 *** 298.35 *** 	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Table 4 Impact of public funding on nanotech papers’ quality in the US - Second stage of regression results of zero-inflated Poisson 
(Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
The US 
nbCitation5it
 zip – model (1)  zip – model (2)  zip – model (3)  zip – model (4) 
W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS 
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
0.0229 ***               
 
0.0229 ***     0.0228 ***               
 
-0.1577 ***                
(0.0087) 
 
             
 
(0.0087) 
 
    (0.0086) 
 
             
 
(0.0511) 
 
               
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.0134 0.0076  0.0083 -0.0112   0.0081 -0.0115  0.0076 -0.0045  
(0.0213) 
 
(0.0184) 
 
 (0.0327) 
 
(0.0279)   (0.0326) 
 
(0.0278) 
 
 (0.0312) 
 
(0.0258)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 0.3232 *** 0.3027 ***  0.3222*** 0.3000 ***  0.3187*** 0.2936**  0.3082** 0.2977 ** 
(0.1205) 
 
(0.1153) 
 
 (0.1200) 
 
(0.1147)   (0.1216) 
 
(0.1157) 
 
 (0.1219) 
 
(0.1161)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 0.0367 *** 0.0452 ***  0.0365*** 0.0444 ***  0.1384
 
0.2082
 
 0.1437
 
0.2522 * 
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0140) 
 
 (0.0134) 
 
(0.0142)   (0.1411)
 
(0.1445)
 
 (0.1381)
 
(0.1434)  
[ nbPast3Patit]2 
   0.0002 0.0010 *  0.0002 0.0010*  0.0002 0.0003  
     (0.0007) (0.0006)   (0.0007) (0.0006)  (0.0007) (0.0007)  
[ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)]2
 
       -0.0150  
-0.0242 
 
 -0.0161 
 
-0.0289  
         (0.0203)  (0.0206)   (0.0199)  (0.0205)  
[ln(GovGrant3it-1)]2 
          0.0150 ***                
            (0.0044)                
Years (1996-2005) Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS 
               0.1882 ***   0.1894 ***                 0.1900 ***   -0.1312 *                (0.0519)     (0.0522)                  (0.0522)     (0.0798)  
[Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS]2 
                                                   0.0303 ***                                                    (0.0086)  
Constant 3.7692 *** 2.8438 ***  3.7726 *** 2.8526 ***  3.7750 *** 2.8494 ***  3.7944 *** 3.6014 *** (0.1763) 
 
(0.3497) 
 
 (0.1785) 
 
(0.3525)   (0.1780) 
 
(0.3529) 
 
 (0.1753) 
 
(0.2613)  
Inflate                                   
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
-0.0285 ***    -0.0289 ***    -0.0291 ***    0.0111    
(0.0043)     (0.0043)     (0.0043)     (0.0317)    
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.0640 *** 0.0663 ***  0.0938 *** 0.1119 ***  0.0932 *** 0.1113 ***  0.0927 *** 0.1154 *** 
(0.0079)  (0.0077)   (0.0097) (0.0096)   (0.0097) (0.0096)  (0.0097) (0.0105)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 -0.3637 *** -0.3704 ***  -0.3619 *** -0.3661 ***  -0.3407 *** -0.3423 ***  -0.3420 *** -0.3410 *** 
(0.0990)  (0.0976)   (0.0991) (0.0976)   (0.0988) (0.0980)  (0.0987) (0.0980)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 -0.3013 *** -0.2920 ***  -0.3005 *** -0.2907 ***  -0.8074 *** -0.8314 ***  -0.8082 *** -0.8226 *** 
(0.0074)  (0.0074)   (0.0074) (0.0074)   (0.0932) (0.0941)  (0.0932) (0.0946)  
[ nbPast3Patit]2
    -0.0019 *** -0.0028 ***  -0.0019 *** -0.0028 ***  -0.0019 *** -0.0032 *** 
     (0.0003) (0.0003)   (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0003) (0.0004)  
[ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)]2
        0.0748 *** 0.0798 ***  0.0749 *** 0.0790 *** 
          (0.0137)  (0.0138)   (0.0137)  (0.0139)  
[ln(GovGrant3it-1)]2 
          -0.0034   
          (0.0027)   
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS 
 -0.1892 ***   -0.1919 ***   -0.1910 ***   -0.2667 *** 
  (0.0123)     (0.0123)     (0.0124)     (0.0565)  
[Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS]2 
           0.0080  
                 (0.0059)  
Constant 
3.8502 *** 4.5818 ***  3.8316 *** 4.5583 ***  3.8425 *** 4.5632 ***  3.8391 *** 4.6994 *** 
(0.0420)  (0.0706) 
 
  (0.0419)  (0.0700)   (0.0423)  (0.0701)   (0.0421)  (0.1201) 
 
Nb observations 
Nb Groups 
56511 56511  56511 56511   56511 56511  56511 56511  
33655  33655   33655 33655   33655 33655  33655 33655  
Loglikelihood -111860 
 
-107574 
 
 -111839 
 
-107474   -111779 
 
-107356 
 
 -110476 -105360  
χ2 41.57*** 40.24***  43.82*** 43.22 ***  43.88*** 43.33***  55.68 *** 73.14 *** 	  
Before turning to the second stage regressions, let us briefly address the first stage results. 
Among the instruments used to correct for endogeneity in the first stage of our model, 
CareerAge are strongly significant to explain the endogenous variable GovGrant3 in both 
countries. Surprisingly we cannot find a significant effect of nbAvgPaper3 on future grants in 
Canada. However, Arora and Gambardella (1998) found that the past performance indirectly 
affects the probability of receiving grants in future. This may be due to the fact that 
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nanotechnology is a young discipline in Canada and that researchers only recently started 
publishing in this field. In contrast this variable is strongly significant in the US. The effect of 
nanotechnology being a young discipline also becomes apparent when we examine the non-
linear impact of CareerAge. We observe a negative coefficient for the square of age on the 
scientific production. This result is consistent with the findings of Costas et al. (2010) who 
highlight the fact that as scientists grow older, they are likely to be more reluctant to be involved 
in new fields. However, we need to be careful in proposing this interpretation, as there have been 
many mixed findings on this issue. Rappa and Debackere (1993) highlight that the relationship 
between age and the ability in science is influenced by numerous factors such as substantive and 
methodological perceptions, specialized interests and affiliations with certain schools of 
thoughts, and not only the age of scientists. Accordingly, Wray (2003; 2004) examined the 
contribution of young scientists in new scientific specialties and found that it is middle-aged 
scientists that are responsible for significant discoveries. There is an extended and inconclusive 
literature on age in science, which we will not review here.  
In the second stage regressions, we find that the number of publications rises as public funding 
increases. Our findings in Canada and the US show an increasing linear trend for the amount of 
publications. The results show that more simple models may be better able to represent the 
influence of government funding in Canada as we captured endogeneity in the first two models, 
but the additional parameters may not be useful. In the US when we increase the complexity of 
model by adding the quadratic term of government funding in model (4), we observe a right- 
hand of a U-shaped curve which also shows the increasing trend of the number of articles (Fig. 
1.a).  
In regard to the influence of public funding on the number of citations (nbCitation5), the average 
amount of government funding seems has no impact for Canada to enhance the quality of 
publications, but exhibiting a J-shaped relationship beyond a point for the US. This observation 
highlights that beyond the minimum value of the J-shaped curve, the number of citations 
increases (Fig. 1.b)10. These results generally are in accordance with the findings of Blume-
Kogut et al. (2009), Fox and Milbourne (1999) and Payne and Siow (2003), who imply that there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We do not believe that this relationship between funding and scientific production (and of its quality) is infinite. 
We examined a cubic term in the regressions but it turned out non significant. Considering the wisdom of the 
granting councils and of the peer review process, however, we very much doubt that an embarrassment of riches in 
academia is likely to appear.  
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is a positive correlation between funding and academic outputs. Accordingly, the positive effect 
of funding suggests a Matthew effect (Merton 1968) that is at play here, hence suggesting that 
greater productivity and greater influence imply greater funding and thus that greater funding 
implies greater productivity and greater influence.  	  
   
Fig. 1 The effect of average amount of government grants, ln(GovGrant3), on (a) the number of papers in the US, (b) the number of 
citations in the US 
The relationship between funding and scientific output always matters to answer policy questions 
and funding allocation decisions. Although prior studies in various fields or specific universities 
have examined this relationship (see Arora et al. 1998; Jacob and Lefgren 2011; Lewison and 
Dawson 1998; Zucker et al., 2007), our study presents a detailed comparison of nanotechnology 
between Canada and the US.  
Regarding scientific collaborations, we find that betweenness centrality has a remarkably 
positive and significant effect on the number of papers in both Canada and the US. Turning to 
the influence of this central position of researchers on the number of citations received by papers, 
we find a positive impact on the number of citations in both the US and Canada. It shows that a 
higher intermediary position of researchers in co-publication networks increase the number of 
scientific papers and research quality in the field of nanotechnology.  
Continuing on network measures, we find that past individual cliquishness of scientists 
contributes to a positive impact on the publications in Canada and the US. When we add the 
quadratic term of cliquishness, we lose the significant results for the models accounting for 
endogeneity (2SLS models) in Canada. But in the US plotting the resulting quadratic curves 
shows a positive effect on the number of publications up to the maximum value of an inverted U-
shaped curve (see Fig a in the Appendix 5). This suggests that the number of papers starts 
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decreasing with higher cliquishness. Although researchers tend to collaborate with other 
scientists to generate more publications, a greater integration eventually hampers their activities 
beyond their collaborative circle in this multidisciplinary field: therefore, researchers should 
avoid acting solely in higher cliquishness groups and explore beyond their restricted networks. 
Similarly, the impact of the past individual cliquishness follows an inverted U-shaped curve on 
the number of citations in Canada when we account for the non-linear impact indicating that 
scientific production quality starts decreasing beyond the maximum value of the cliquishness, 
but in the US we only capture the linear impact on the number of citations (see Fig E.2 in the 
Appendix E). A better network position generally enhances research productivity and research 
quality of scientists in both studied countries.  
We also examined whether there is a relationship between invention disclosures of academic 
researchers and their scientific output. The results show that the average number of patents to 
which a researcher has contributed over the past three years has a positive influence on his/her 
scientific production in Canada. These industrial interests increase the number of publications 
and the results of our first econometric model (model 1) show a reinforcing effect on the research 
quality of academic scientists in Canada. This can also reflect a self-selection effect rather than 
superior performance (see Moed 2007; Wildhagen 2009; Wagner 2010). The observed 
reinforcing effect may therefore derive from the fact that academic scientists with higher prior 
performance regarding scientific production move to patenting activities. Similarly, Cummings 
and Kiesler (2008) show the self-selection bias in successful collaborations in which 
collaborators that have had experience of working closely in the past develop strong ties with 
those collaborators in the future again and this plausibly result in higher performance. 
In the US, no significant results are found for the correlation between the number of patents in 
past three years and the quantity and quality of scientific production in the field of 
nanotechnology. However, our results in Canada are similar to those of Azoulay et al. (2009), 
Czarnitzki et al. (2007) and Van Looy et al. (2006), who suggest a reinforcing effect of patenting 
on scientific outputs and highlight the fact that academic inventors create output of significantly 
higher quantity and quality. We posit that the same effect is at play in Canada in the field of 
nanotechnology and as a consequence, that the involvement in entrepreneurial activities within 
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universities is not negatively associated with publication: on the contrary, these patenting 
activities may increase the quantity and quality of publications.  
We defined a dummy variable taking the value 1 for Canadian scientists and the value of 0 for 
scientists that are affiliated to the US, to examine the difference between Canada and the US. We 
then re-estimated our regressions on the pooled sample. We run regressions for all four models 
but only present the first model in this paper11. The findings show that in the US, government 
funding has a stronger impact on both the quantity and the quality of scientific production 
compared to Canada. But regarding the network characteristics, the intermediary position of 
scientists measured by betweenness centrality comes to be more important in nanotechnology 
research outputs in Canada and cliquishness has higher impact on the quantity of research in the 
US. The results are shown in Table 5. 
Our results reveal that scientists who receive government funding contribute to a more prolific 
scientific production in both countries and of a higher quality in the US. Marginal effects are 
commonly used to examine how much a dependent variable is expected to increase or decrease 
by one unit change of other variables (Cameron and Trivedi 2009; Wooldridge 2002). We 
calculated Marginal Effects at the Means (MEMs)12 for the number of papers and the number of 
citations in both Canada and the US (presented in Table 6). The marginal effect of government 
grants on the number of papers in Canada and the US shows that additional funding leads to 
approximately 4 times more citations in the US than in Canada but only to a slight increase in 
impact on the number of papers in the US. We also find that for the marginal effect of the 
network characteristics, betweenness centrality corresponds to more papers and higher quality 
papers in Canada compared to the US while cliquishness has quite the same impact on the 
quantity of papers in both countries and higher impact on research quality in Canada. We can 
however conclude that while government funding is more important in the US, collaboration 
between researchers is more likely to enhance quantity and quality of research outputs in 
Canada. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The full results are available from the authors in an unpublished appendix. 
12 In this model, marginal effects are computed to measure a change in one of explanatory variables when the values of other explanatory 
variables are set at their means. 
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Table 5 The comparison of the impact of public funding on nanotech papers’ quantity and quality in Canada and the US - Second 
Stage of regression results (Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Variables
 nbPaperit
 
 nbCitation5it
 
W/O Endog 
Model (1) 
2SLS 
Model (1) 
 W/O Endog 
Model (1) 
2SLS 
Model (1) 
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 0.0265 *** 
  
 0.0225 ***               
 (0.0037) 
 
             
 
(0.0087) 
 
             
 nbPast3Patit-1
 
0.0034 -0.0011  0.0128 0.0082
(0.0089) 
 
(0.0078) 
 
 (0.0215) 
 
(0.0194) 
 ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 
0.1671*** 0.1333**  0.3245 *** 0.3007 ** 
(0.0577) 
 
(0.0548) 
 
 (0.1218) 
 
(0.1176) 
 ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 
0.0916*** 0.0956***  0.0359 *** 0.0411 *** 
(0.0061) 
 
(0.0059) 
 
 (0.0132) 
 
(0.0137) 
 dCanada 0.2937*** 1.2064***  -0.2335 * 0.4073 ** 
(0.0716) (0.1036)  (0.1257)  (0.1890)  
dCanada × ln(GovGrant3it-1)
 
-0.0255 *** -0.2295 ***  -0.0071 -0.1445 *** 
(0.0085) (0.0190)  (0.0125)  (0.0367)  
dCanada × nbPast3Patit-1
 
0.1003 *** 0.1051 ***  0.1116 *** 0.1174 *** 
(0.0159) (0.0152)  (0.0268)  (0.0242)  
dCanada × ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 
0.2005 *** 0.2337 ***  -0.0483 -0.0275 
(0.0765) (0.0631)  (0.1456)  (0.1364)  
dCanada × ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 
-0.0759 *** -0.0757 ***  -0.0190 -0.0207 
(0.0145) (0.0134)  (0.0223)  (0.0218)  
Years (1996-2005) Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS               
 
0.2424 ***                
 
0.1715 *** 
             
 
(0.0203) 
 
              
 
(0.0399) 
 Constant 0.5276*** -0.6292***  3.7725 *** 2.9861 *** 
(0.0823) 
 
(0.1354) 
 
 (0.1762) 
 
(0.2799) 
 Inflate    
ln(GovGrant3it-1) -0.0144 ***   -0.0291 ***  
(0.0028)   (0.0034)    
nbPast3Patit-1
 
0.0557 *** 0.0546 ***  0.1021 *** 0.0988 *** 
(0.0049) (0.0049)  (0.0083)  (0.0081)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 
-0.5422 *** -0.5253 ***  -0.7851 *** -0.7689 *** 
(0.0550) (0.0564)  (0.0517)  (0.0501)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 
-0.2712 *** -0.2583 ***  -0.2471 *** -0.2414 *** 
(0.0054) (0.0055)  (0.0061)  (0.0061)  
Prediction(GovGrant3it-1)-2SLS  -0.0566 ***   -0.1097 *** 
 (0.0075)    (0.0081)  
Constant 2.0990 *** 2.1576 ***  3.3520 *** 3.7285 *** 
(0.0269) (0.0536)  (0.0320)  (0.0494)  
Nb observations 64691 
 
64691   64691  
64691  
Nb Groups 37339
 
37339   37339  
37339 
 Loglikelihood -38077.5
 
-37107.6 
 
 -163417 
 
-158949 
 χ2 639.20*** 921.81***  114.74 *** 125.62 *** 	  
Table 6 Estimated Marginal Effects in Canada and the US (Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Variables 
Canada The US 
Delta method (dy/dx) Delta method (dy/dx) 
nbPaperit 
Model (1) 
nbCitation5it 
Model (1) 
nbPaperit 
Model (1) 
nbCitation5it 
Model (1) 
ln(GovGrant3it-1)
 
0.0443 *** 0.0856  0.0507 *** 0.3361 *** 
 (0.0124)  (0.0634)  (0.0025)  (0.0377)  
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.0629 *** 1.1827 *** -0.0075 *** -0.0515 *** 
(0.0125)  (0.2040)  (0.0010)  (0.0195)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 
0.3179 *** 4.9079 *** 0.0948 *** 0.5987 *** 
(0.0275)  (0.6094)  (0.0159)  (0.1243)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2) 0.0442 *** 0.6525 *** 0.0545 *** 0.2978 *** 
(0.0049)  (0.1124)  (0.0014)  (0.0232)  
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CONCLUSIONS 
As we mentioned in the introduction, in recent years, governments have launched research-
financing programs increasingly targeted towards nanotechnology development within 
universities to incite the growth of this emerging technology. It is thus of great importance to 
further understand whether government funding can indeed enhance the success of this 
development and can be powerful to lead research in the academic realm. Debates have arisen on 
the question of whether public funding enhances the scientific outputs in emerging high 
technologies and to that effect we have examined publications of the very promising field of 
nanotechnology as a typical example of science-based technology. Nanotechnology is still in the 
early stages of its lifecycle and as such, the role of public funding is of paramount importance for 
its development. We take into account the nanotechnology-related scientific output in Canada 
and compare the efficiency and productivity of government funding in this high technology with 
the US as a leading country in nanotechnology research development.  
At the beginning of this article, we set out to examine three hypotheses, one related to the public 
funding of research and another one to the collaboration related to research. In the third 
hypothesis, we compare the funding effect in Canada and the US. Let us address each of these 
hypotheses in turn.  
Regarding the influence of public funding on scientific production, the impact on the number of 
papers is overwhelmingly significant and positive in the United States, where both the number 
and the quality of publications increases as funding amount rises. However, for the publication 
quality, this positive relationship is only observed in the US. The results for Canada do not show 
that government funding has an impact on the publication quality. These results are supporting 
both Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b for the US and only Hypothesis 1a for Canada.  Our 
results, hence, are in general accordance with the work of various scholars (Adams et al. 2005; 
Adams and Griliches 1998; Arora et al. 1998; Blume-Kogut et al. 2009; Jacob and Lefgren, 
2007; Payne and Siow 2003; Sauer 1988), on the crucial importance of funding for the 
production of scientific output. Although, in general our results are in line with previous studies, 
to our knowledge, this is the first time that a study focuses on the impact of funding on 
nanotechnology in both Canada and the US and the comparison between these two countries in 
addition to considering the importance of scientific networks at the same time.  
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We include the industrial interests of academic researchers to further understand whether patents 
representing potential commercialization are associated with the production of academic 
publications. Our study on nanotechnology-related patents shows that patenting activities in 
universities are associated with more scientific papers only in Canada and not in the US and even 
in Canada this positive effect is more consistent in terms of the productivity of researchers rather 
than in terms of the quality of their publications. However, the relationship between these two 
types of research outputs could be described as complementary and reinforcing rather than 
substitutive. Although we expected to observe a shift in research output of academic inventors 
toward more applicable and commercial research, we found that researchers who contribute to 
more and higher quality patents in previous years are more likely to generate publications of 
higher quantity in Canada. Nanotechnology, however, is a young field and has considerable 
potential in a wide range of disciplines: It is an emerging technology which is close to its science 
base, but it is getting increasingly closer to technology applications in a variety of domains and 
subdomains. As such, we could find a direct connection of academic inventors with their 
publications, generally similar to the work of some scholars in other fields (Azoulay 2009; 
Breschi et al. 2007; Czarnitzki et al. 2007; Wong and Sing 2010), implying that academic 
scientists who produce patents also exhibit a higher research performance. We however support 
their findings in the field of emerging nanotechnology in Canada.  
In the field of nanotechnology, we observe an increasing tendency of researchers to form 
research teams whose expertise span over a wide range of domains. Funding agencies thus 
commonly allocate financial resources to teams of scientists rather than individual researchers. In 
our second hypothesis we therefore focus on the way in which these collaborative teams are 
structured and shed some light on the impact of the network architecture on the scientific 
production of the teams. We examine the research performance of scientists using previous 
collaborations in the past three years to find the impact on scientists’ subsequent productivity.  
In this empirical study, we discover that the position of individual researchers in scientific 
networks does influence their knowledge production. We find a remarkably positive and 
significant impact of the intermediary position of scientists on their number of publications and 
article quality in both Canada and the US.  
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With respect to the past individual cliquishness of researchers in their co-authorship networks, 
we find that the cliquishness value yields a positive impact on scientific output in Canada. As 
such, we observe this positive impact only when we add a quadratic term of cliquishness to the 
model in which it shows a positive impact until a threshold is reached. Beyond this specific point 
further along the curve, a higher clustering coefficient decreases the efficiency of articles 
published implying that researchers working in more clustered collaborative environments 
become less productive and efficient. This may be explained by the possible inclination of 
authors in cliquish environments to cite scientists with whom they are linked in their network.  
Regarding this collaboration measurement in the US, our results tend to support the notion that 
clustered environments enhance scientific productivity and confirm the efficiency of these 
collaborative networks in knowledge diffusion. We find that clustered networks increasingly 
augment scientific productivity and efficiency of a scientist. We thus accept Hypothesis 2a and 
Hypothesis 2b for which our results are generally in line with Balconi et al. (2004), Breschi et al. 
(2006), Newman (2001), Ni et al. (2011), Persson et al. (2004) and Velema (2012) who highlight 
the positive influence of collaborations on research productivity. 
In regards to the comparison of Canada and the US, when we compare the marginal effects in 
both countries and regression results of pooled sample, we find that government grants yield a 
greater effect on the nanotechnology publication in the US, while better network characteristics 
lead to more and higher quality publications in Canada compared to the US. Thus we reject both 
Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b in terms of the higher influence of government grants in 
Canada rather than in the US. 
There are a number of limitations to this research. One concern is the mobility of researchers 
across the US and Canada: Since the main purpose of this research is the comparison of the 
research productivity for the researchers affiliated to Canadian and American institutions, the 
mobility of these researchers and the resulting changes in the institutional affiliations clearly 
affect the results of this study. This issue, however, could not be considered in this study. The 
other limitation lies in the accurate identification of nanotechnology papers. In spite of our 
attempt to extract and analyze papers most closely related to nanotechnology, we may lose some 
papers due to our narrow definition of what constitutes a nanotechnology article. The other 
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limitation is merging different databases that may have caused some deterioration or loss of the 
data. Another issue that concerns this study is using different data sources for Canada and the 
US, which can cause inconsistency in our comparison of the two countries. Despite these 
caveats, we are confident that our results are a step in the right direction and identify avenues for 
future research on research funding and on the importance and influence of research networks.  
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Appendix A 
Table A.1 - First stage regressions results –The US (Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
The US nbPaper ( FS-reg)  nbCitation5 ( FS-reg) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.0315 *** 0.1174 *** 0.1172 *** 0.1172 ***  0.0315 *** 0.1174 *** 0.1172 *** 0.1172 *** (0.0041) 
 
(0.0099) 
 
(0.0099)  (0.0099)   (0.0041)  (0.0099)  (0.0099)  
(0.0099) 
 [nbPast3Patit]2
               -0.0049 *** -0.0049 *** -0.0049 ***                 -0.0049 *** -0.0049 *** -0.0049 *** 
              
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0005)  (0.0005)                 (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
(0.0005) 
 ln(104×BetweenCentit-
2)
 
-0.0201 -0.0083  0.0142  0.0142   -0.0201  -0.0083  0.0142 0.0142 
(0.2238)  (0.2232)  (0.2232)  (0.2232)   (0.2238)  (0.2232)  (0.2232)  (0.2232) 
 ln(103×Cliquishnessit-
2)
 
-0.1912 *** -0.1874 *** -0.7074 *** -0.7074 ***  -0.1912 *** -0.1874 *** -0.7074 *** -0.7074 *** (0.0133)  (0.0133)  (0.1985)  (0.1985)   (0.0133)  (0.0133)  (0.1985)  (0.1985) 
 [ln(103×Cliquishnessit-
2)]2
 
              
 
              
 
0.0769 *** 0.0769 ***                              0.0769 *** 0.0769 ***                               (0.0293)  (0.0293)                               (0.0293)  (0.0293) 
 CareerAge
 1.1155 *** 1.1148 *** 1.1153 *** 1.1153 ***  1.1155 *** 1.1148 *** 1.1153 *** 1.1153 *** (0.0160) 
 
(0.0160) 
 
(0.0160)  (0.0160)   (0.0160)  (0.0160)  (0.0160)  
(0.0160) 
 [CareerAge]2
 -0.0585 *** -0.0584 *** -0.0584 *** -0.0584 ***  -0.0585 *** -0.0584 *** -0.0584 *** -0.0584 *** (0.0014) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0014)  (0.0014)   (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  
(0.0014) 
 nbAvgPaper3t-1
 0.1879 *** 0.1895 *** 0.1920 *** 0.1920 ***  0.1879 *** 0.1895 *** 0.1920 *** 0.1920 *** (0.0370) 
 
(0.0367) 
 
(0.0366)  (0.0366)   (0.0370)  (0.0367)  (0.0366)  
(0.0366) 
 Years
 
Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 Yes   Yes ** 
Constant
 1.2424 *** 1.1643 *** 1.1623 *** 1.1623 ***  1.2424 *** 1.1643 *** 1.1623 *** 1.1623 *** (0.0900) 
 
(0.0905) 
 
(0.0905)  (0.0905)   (0.0900)  (0.0905)  (0.0905)  
(0.0905) 
 Nb-observations 56511   56511  56511  56511   56511  56511  56511   56511  
Nb-groups
 
33655  33655  
33655  33655   
33655  33655  33655  33655  
Loglikelihood -171712  -171636  -171632  -171632   -171712  -171636  -171632  -171632  
R2 0.1634  0.1656  0.1658  0.1658   0.1634  0.1656  0.1658  0.1658  
 
Table A.2 - First stage regressions results –Canada (Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Canada nbPaper ( FS-reg)  nbCitation5 ( FS-reg) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.0102 
 
0.2081 
 
0.2034  0.2034   0.0102  0.2081  0.2034  
0.2034 
 (0.0749) 
 
(0.1464) 
 
(0.1477)  (0.1477)   (0.0749)  (0.1464)  (0.1477)  
(0.1477) 
 [nbPast3Patit]2
               -0.0238 * -0.0238 * -0.0238 *                 -0.0238 * -0.0238 * -0.0238 * 
              
 
(0.0140) 
 
(0.0142)  (0.0142)                 (0.0140)  (0.0142)  
(0.0142) 
 ln(104×BetweenCentit-
2)
 
-0.0881 -0.0890  -0.2045  -0.2045   -0.0881  -0.0890  -0.2045 -0.2045 
(0.1255) 
 
(0.1257) 
 
(0.1473)  (0.1473)   (0.1255)  (0.1257)  (0.1473) 
 
(0.1473) 
 ln(103×Cliquishnessit-
2)
 
-0.0654 *** -0.0670 *** 0.4253  0.4253   -0.0654 *** -0.0670 *** 0.4253  
0.4253 
 (0.0216) 
 
(0.0217) 
 
(0.3408)  (0.3408)   (0.0216)  (0.0217)  (0.3408) 
 
(0.3408) 
 [ln(103×Cliquishnessit-
2)]2
 
              
 
              
 
-0.0724  -0.0724                               -0.0724  
-0.0724 
               
 
              
 
(0.0501)  (0.0501)                               (0.0501) 
 
(0.0501) 
 CareerAge
 0.7714 *** 0.7721 *** 0.7705 *** 0.7705 ***  0.7714 *** 0.7721 *** 0.7705 *** 0.7705 *** (0.0342) 
 
(0.0342) 
 
(0.0341)  (0.0341)   (0.0342)  (0.0342)  (0.0341)  
(0.0341) 
 [CareerAge]2
 -0.0393 *** -0.0394 *** -0.0394 *** -0.0394 ***  -0.0393 *** -0.0394 *** -0.0394 *** -0.0394 *** (0.0025) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0025)  (0.0025)   (0.0025)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  
(0.0025) 
 nbAvgPaper3t-1
 0.0250 
 
0.0196 
 
-0.0036  -0.0036   0.0250  0.0196  -0.0036  
-0.0036 
 (0.0493) 
 
(0.0497) 
 
(0.0545)  (0.0545)   (0.0493)  (0.0497)  (0.0545)  
(0.0545) 
 Years
 
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 Yes   Yes  
Constant
 -0.9853 *** -0.9918 *** -0.9854 *** -0.9854 ***  -0.9853 *** -0.9918 *** -0.9854 *** -0.9854 *** (0.0800) 
 
(0.0802) 
 
(0.0799)  (0.0799)   (0.0800)  (0.0802)  (0.0799)  
(0.0799) 
 Nb-observations 8180 
 
8180 
 
8180  8180   
56511  56511  56511   56511  
Nb-groups
 
3684  3684  3684  3684   3684  3684  3684  3684  
Loglikelihood -23680  -23678  -23677  -23677   -23680  -23678  -23677  -23677  
R2 0.2254  0.2258  0.2260  0.2260   0.2254  0.2258  0.2260  0.2260  
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Table B.1 - Descriptive statistics 
 Canada  United States 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
nbPapert	   8180 1 2 0 44  56511 0 1 0 44 
nbCitation5t	   8180 8 39 0 985  56511 2 24 0 1766 
ln(GovGrant3t-1)	   8180 10 1 4 15  56511 11 1 0 17 
nbPast3Patit-1
 
8180 0 1 0 40  56511 3 5 0 53 
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
	  
8180 0 1 0 5  56511 0 0 0 4 
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
	  
8180 2 3 0 7  56511 1 3 0 7 
CareerAge
	  
8180 6 5 1 21  56511 5 5 1 21 
nbAvgPaper3t-1	   8180 0 1 0 37  56511 0 1 0 40 
 
 
Appendix C 
Table C.1 - Correlation Matrix – Canada 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
nbPapert 1 1 
       nbCitation5t 2 0.7545 1
      ln(GovGrant3t-1) 3 0.0143 0.0162 1
     nbPast3Patit-1
 
4 0.084 0.0906 0.0086 1
    ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 
5 0.5736 0.4333 0.0305 0.0801 1
   ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 
6 0.3435 0.2421 0.027 0.0717 0.3096 1
  CareerAge
 
7 0.1225 0.0866 0.1216 0.0634 0.1569 0.1055 1
 nbAvgPaper3t-1 8 0.8679 0.6565 0.0253 0.0915 0.6669 0.3879 0.153 1
 
Table C.2 - Correlation Matrix – The US 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
nbPapert 1 1        nbCitation5t 2 0.4706 1       ln(GovGrant3t-1) 3 0.0494 0.0361 1      nbPast3Patit-1
 
4 -0.0622 -0.0187 -0.0115 1     ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 
5 0.1030 0.0410 0.0088 -0.0331 1    
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 
6 0.3845 0.1385 0.0338 -0.1133 0.1943 1   CareerAge
 
7 0.2097 0.0837 0.1669 -0.0949 0.0674 0.2643 1  nbAvgPaper3t-1 8 0.8967 0.4532 0.0537 -0.0685 0.1123 0.4224 0.2481 1 
 
  
	   36 
Appendix D 
Table D.1 - Second Stage of regression results of Poisson model – Impact of public funding on the number of papers and the number of 
citations in Canada and the US (Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Variable
	   nbPaper  nbCitation5 Canada 
Model (1) 
The US 
Model (1)  
Canada 
Model (1) 
The US 
Model (1) 
W/O Endog  2SLS  W/O  Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS 
W/O 
Endog 
2SLS 
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
-0.0005 
 
              
 
0.0377 ***               
 
0.0072 
 
              
 
0.0538 ***               
(0.0081) 
 
             
 
(0.0036)               
 
(0.0114)
 
             
 
(0.0105) 
 
              
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.1567*** 0.1484*** -0.0331 *** -0.0352***  0.1892 *** 0.1837 *** -0.0358 -0.0430  
(0.0197) 
 
(0.0197) 
 
(0.0087)  (0.0079) 
 
 (0.0237) 
 
(0.0238) 
 
(0.0308) 
 
(0.0266)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 0.6327*** 0.6137*** 0.3414 *** 0.3404***  0.6316 *** 0.6200*** 0.5031 *** 0.5296 *** 
(0.0480) 
 
(0.0460) 
 
(0.0585)  (0.0553) 
 
 (0.0789) 
 
(0.0766) 
 
(0.1185) 
 
(0.1212)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 0.1226*** 0.1195*** 0.3138 *** 0.3097***  0.1105 *** 0.1089 *** 0.3380 *** 0.3468 *** 
(0.0117) 
 
(0.0117) 
 
(0.0063)  (0.0063) 
 
 (0.0190) 
 
(0.0190) 
 
(0.0184) 
 
(0.0209)  
Years (1996-2005) Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Prediction(GovGrant3it-
1)-2SLS 
               (0.1002) ***   0.3491 ***                 0.0696  
              
 
0.5329 *** 
              0.0319    (0.0219)                 (0.0500)                (0.0863)  
Constant -0.7651 *** -1.3227 *** -1.6618 *** -2.9757 ***  2.0338 *** 1.6903 *** 0.3458 * -1.8670 *** (0.0848) 
 
(0.1998) 
 
(0.0842)  (0.1349) 
 
 (0.1240) 
 
(0.3038) 
 
(0.2053) 
 
(0.5276)  
Nb observations 8180  8180  56511  
 56511
 
  8180  8180  56511 
 
 56511 
 
 
Nb Groups 3684  3684  33655  33655   3684  3684  33655  33655  Loglikelihood -8625 
 
-8601  -41322  -38924   -133895  
-133755  -413909  
-382311  
χ2 714.6 *** 675.9 *** 5104 *** 5266 ***  636.89 *** 631.12 ***  968.10 *** 788.54 *** 
 
Table D.2 - Second Stage of regression results of xtpoisson model – Impact of public funding on the number of papers and the number of 
citations in Canada and the US (Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Variable
	   nbPaper  nbCitation5 Canada 
Model (1) 
The US 
Model (1)  
Canada 
Model (1) 
The US 
Model (1) 
W/O Endog  2SLS  W/O  Endog 2SLS  W/O Endog 2SLS 
W/O 
Endog 
2SLS 
ln(GovGrant3it-1) 
-0.0145 ***               
 
0.0171 ***               
 
0.0003 
 
              
 
0.0019 **                
(0.0049) 
 
             
 
(0.0019)               
 
(0.0015)
 
             
 
(0.0008) 
 
               
nbPast3Patit-1
 0.2196*** 0.2156*** -0.0338 *** -0.0406***  0.2248 *** 0.2385*** -0.0082 *** -0.0189 *** 
(0.0314) 
 
(0.0319) 
 
(0.0033)  (0.0033) 
 
 (0.0094) 
 
(0.0095) 
 
(0.0017) 
 
(0.0018)  
ln(104×BetweenCentit-2)
 0.1642*** 0.1382*** 0.2207 *** 0.1534***  -0.1501 *** -0.1507*** 0.4149 *** 0.4100 *** 
(0.0229) 
 
(0.0231) 
 
(0.0431)  (0.0433) 
 
 (0.0077) 
 
(0.0076) 
 
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0138)  
ln(103×Cliquishnessit-2)
 0.0108
 
0.0008
 
0.0954 *** 0.1221***  -0.0874 *** -0.0810 *** -0.0223 *** -0.0099 *** 
(0.0084)
 
(0.0083)
 
(0.0040)  (0.0039) 
 
 (0.0025) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0015) 
 
(0.0015)  
Years (1996-2005) Yes Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Prediction(GovGrant3it-
1)-2SLS 
              
 
0.1770 ***   0.2420 ***                
 
0.1457 ***               
 
0.0863 *** 
             
 
(0.0217) 
 
  (0.0062) 
 
              
 
(0.0073) 
 
              
 
(0.0031)  
Constant -0.3677*** -1.3967*** -1.7050 *** -2.7025***  3.0109 *** 2.1255 *** 0.0643  
-0.3056 *** 
(0.0633) 
 
(0.1290) 
 
(0.0523)  (0.0593) 
 
 (0.0728) 
 
(0.0835) 
 
(0.0613)
 
(0.0617)  
ln(alpha) 
1.3243*** 1.3317*** 2.0456 *** 1.8212***  2.8822 *** 2.8617 *** 4.7488 *** 4.7103 *** 
(0.0510) (0.0502) (0.0240)  (0.0246)  (0.0360)  (0.0361)  (0.0276)  (0.0278)  
Nb observations 8180  8180  56511  
 56511 
 
  8180  8180  56511 
 
 56511 
 
 
Nb Groups 3684  3684  33655  33655   3684  3684  33655  
33655  
Loglikelihood -6647.69 
 
-6618.4  -28720.8  -27992.3   -39780.8  
-39578.7  -76589.6  
-76193.1  
χ2 496.26 *** 545.68 *** 2185.0 *** 3586.8 ***  8692.9 *** 8914.9 ***  6384.3 *** 7102.7 *** 	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Appendix E 
   
Fig E. A Quadratic effect of past individual cliquishness of scientists, Cliquishness, on (E.1) the number of papers in the US and (E.2) the 
number of citations in Canada 	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(b) ln(103 x Cliquishness)- Canada  
